# Borders Aff

## 1AC – Geopolitics and Coloniality

## Contention 1: The Borderlands

We begin this debate with Gloria Anzaldua’s “To live in the borderlands means you”

To live in the Borderlands means knowing  
     that the *india* in you, betrayed for 500 years,  
     is no longer speaking to you,  
     that *mexicanas*call you *rajetas*,  
     that denying the Anglo inside you  
     is as bad as having denied the Indian or Black;  
  
*Cuando vives in la frontera(when you live on the border)*  
     people walk through you, the wind steals your voice,  
     you’re a *burra, buey*, scapegoat,  
     forerunner of a new race,  
     half and half—both woman and man, neither—  
     a new gender;  
  
To live in the Borderlands means to  
     put *chile* in the borscht,  
     eat whole wheat tortillas,  
     speak Tex-Mex with a Brooklyn accent;  
     be stopped by *la migra* at the border checkpoints;  
  
Living in the Borderlands means you fight hard to  
     resist the gold elixir beckoning from the bottle,  
     the pull of the gun barrel,  
     the rope crushing the hollow of your throat;  
  
In the Borderlands  
     you are the battleground  
     where enemies are kin to each other;  
     you are at home, a stranger,  
     the border disputes have been settled  
     the volley of shots have shattered the truce  
     you are wounded, lost in action  
     dead, fighting back;  
  
To live in the Borderlands means  
     the mill with the razor white teeth wants to shred off   
     your olive-red skin, crush out the kernel, your heart  
     pound you pinch you roll you out  
     smelling like white bread but dead;  
  
To survive the Borderlands  
     you must live *sin fronteras*  
     be a crossroads.

#### Gloria Anzaldua gets to the root understanding of the Border. Borders are the forefront of all imperial control. Borders did not just arise with the creation of earth. Eurocentric notions of the world dictated that great powers would have access to the most enriching parts of the land. This creation of the border is the root cause of all violence between nation states.

O Tuathail 96’(Gearoid, Associate Professor of Geography at VT and Professor of Government and International Affairs, Critical Geopolitics p.1-2)

Geography is about power. Although often assumed to be innocent the geography of the world is not a product of nature but a product of histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy, and administer space. Imperial systems throughout history, from classical Greece and Rome to China and the Arab world, exercised their power through their ability to impose order and meaning upon space. In 16th century Europe, the centralizing states of the “new monarchs” began organizing space around an intensified principle of royal absolutism. In regions both within and beyond the nominal domain of the Crown, the power of royal authority over space was extended and deepened by newly powerful court bureaucracies and armies. The results in many instances were often violent, as the jurisdictional ambitions of total authority met the determined resistance of certain local and regional lords. Within the context of this struggle, the cartographic and other descriptive forms of knowledge that took the name “geography” in the early modern period and that were written in the name of the sovereign could hardly be anything else but political. To the opponents of the expansionist court, “geography was a foreign imposition, a form of knowledge conceived in imperial capitals and dedicated to the territorialization of space along the lines established by royal authority. Geography was not something already posses by the earth but an active writing of the earth by an expanding, centralizing imperial state. It was not a noun but a verb, a geo-graphing, an earth-writing by ambitious endocolonizing and exocolonizing states who sought to seize space and organize it to fit their own cultural visions and material interests. More than five hundred years later, this struggle between centralizing states and authoritative centers, on the on hand, and rebellious margins and dissident cultures, on the other hand, is still with us. While almost all of the land of the earth has now been territorialized by states, the process by which this disciplining of space by modern states occurs remain highly contested. From Chechnya to Chiapas and from Rondonia to Kurdistann and East Timor, the jurisdictions of centralized nation-states strive to eliminate the contradictions of marginalized peoples and nations. Idealized maps from the center clash with the lived geographies of the margin, with the controlling cartographic visions of the former frequently inducing cultural conflict, war, and displacement. Indeed, the rise in absolute number of displaced peoples in the past twenty-five years is testimony to the persistence of struggles over space and place. In 1993 The United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees estimated that roughly 1 in every 130 people on earth has been forced into flight because of war and state persecution. In 1970 there were 2.5 million refugees in the world; today that figure is well over 18.2 million. In addition an estimated 24 million people are internally displaced within their own states because of conflict. More recently, genocide in Rwanda left over 500,000 murdered and produced an unprecedented exodus of refuges from that state into surrounding states. Refugees continue to be generated by “ethnic cleansing” campaigns in the Balkans; economic collapse in Cuba; ethnic wars in the Caucus; state repression in Guatemala, Turkey, Indonesia, Iraq, and Sudan; and xenophobic terror in many other states. Struggles over the ownership, administration, and mastery of space are an inescapable part of the dynamic of contemporary global politics.

#### Specifically the border separating the United States and Mexico is a construction of racism – as Anzaldua describes it “you must live on the border to be the border” – the border politics are the root cause of all gendered and racial stereotypes created by the border.

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I have previously argued that narratives and stories, even those gleaned from popular culture, can humanize the law, that is, flesh out its impact on people's lives. 10 1 In the context of exploring the breadth of the social injustices at the U.S.-Mexico border, which teems with opportunities for a better life as well as for the high risks of death at the hands of United States agents, storytelling is crucial.102 Arguably, taking on the subject of the border as a whole by deconstructing the interrelationship between routine border patrol enforcement, which appears mostly to impact male migrants, and the transnational relocation of American companies who will mostly employ Latinas, is not possible. It will either be too much or too little in my effort to grasp fully the interrelationships between life, labor, and law on both sides of the border. In fact, taking on such a project feels like a transgressive act, one that violates the intellectual or political borders discouraging me from centralizing the experiences of Mexican citizens while I presume to analyze the impact of American law and policy.103 But for a critical legal theorist, this is a worthy transgressive act. Undoubtedly, to open the door to the study of the border is to invite an overwhelming sense of defeatism. This is the daunting task of deconstructing all of what is embedded in the casual mention of "life on the border." To residents of the Southwest, the short phrase means so much, although its interpretation will obviously vary depending upon the person's own identity. Among the dominant classes, for example, including Anglo-whites and assimilated Mexican-Americans, or other non-Mexicans, the reference evokes images of the opportunities for cheap imported products and a high return on the American dollar for resorts, hotels, liquor, and weekend getaways. At one time an American's crossing into Mexico also meant the quick abortion one could not obtain in the United States or even a quick divorce. 10 4 But, a look at the border from a human rights or social justice standpoint triggers a more complex picture. Many are able to ignore it because a host of common stereotypes effectively dehumanize the identity of the border resident/Mexican citizen into faceless "illegals,"' 0 1 5 "dumb Mexicans,"'1 6 "wets" '10 7 or "wetbacks," and "difficult to train Mexican maids."' 08 Yet, underlying these stereotypes are the voices of persons whose human needs and despair intersect with socio-economic problems that are vast, originating as they do in seemingly uncontrollable phenomena such as the culture of poverty,10 9 legitimized corporate profiteering through the use of cheap foreign labor, and environmental abuse. The problems are compounded by limited or uncoordinated bi-governmental oversight of the corporate activities that give rise to the occupational and environmental hazards, either because of incomplete restraints or loopholes in immigration regulations,t" 0 trade agreements like NAFTA," 1 or lax enforcement of labor policies under Mexican law. 112 The **researcher of life on the border must also confront the prevailing attitude that whatever happens on the other side is of no concern to Americans, no matter how bad the problem.**113 I would argue, however, that **some issues involving the U.S.-Mexico border cannot be ignored** by the socially progressive theorist. For some people, life on the border is a constant skirting of the edges of death. Exposure to life-threatening working conditions or inhaled production chemicals are a problem.' 14 At the very least, this is an issue of human rights or environmental racism. As the workforce in these American owned maquiladoras is highly feminized, the issue of women's treatment should evoke the concerns of the feminist theorist. As the women in *maquiladoras* are mostly Mexicanas or from Central and South America, their treatment is a concern for the Latina critical legal theorist. The question then is what is the appropriate response and how does one analyze the social justice issues of "life on the U.S.-Mexico border," with a rational and manageable approach capable of producing recommendable solutions either in law or public policy?

#### Conceptualizations of the border are inherently colonialist – these constructions of borders dictate and symbolize that one race is superior to another – this ultimately makes the indigenous people living on the other side of the border victims of colonial violence.

Shapiro 97

(Michael J. Shapiro, professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, Violent Cartographies. P26-28) DF

Rectilinearity... was a spatial stratagem for bringing space within the realm of communication ... it was a means for speeding up the appearance of things, for hastening the nearness of distant objects. It was the most efficient medium of exchange.79 In short, the engraving is a device for translating the spatial practice of political economy into a moral economy. The result is a devaluation— nearly a denial—of the socioeconomic practices of indigenes. It is not a matter of people with differing practices reaching an accommodation. The Europeans' perspective on their encounter with American aboriginals in North America is very much like the one of which Carter wrote in the context of Australia: the aboriginals "constituted the rebellious nature which the authorities had to subdue."80 In addition to the moralizing of political economy that the engraving reflects, it also participates in the historical legitimation of "settlement," with all that settled inhabitation implies in a place once used otherwise. Landscapes are not constructed as objects of disinterest; the trading ship in the middle ground speaks of commerce, while the dwellings speak of settlement, and the trees and natives in the foreground represent that which has yet to be domesticated. The map as a whole is therefore one of the rhetorical mechanisms for translating a dynamic space of encounter into a fixed space of settlement, extended into the future.81 To settle in, as Carter has noted, has a pervasively linguistic dimension; it involves "a process of teaching the country to speak."82 Carter's If we accept the notion that war involves destruction of a people's source of identity, it must be underscored that names are not mere designations of place; they are complex cultural practices. For example, the western Apaches have had for centuries a practice they call "speaking with names."88 Such speaking is not everyday discourse; "it is considered appropriate under certain circumstances only, and these conditions, which Apaches describe as socially 'taut' (ndoh) and 'heavy' (ndaaz), tend to occur infrequently."89 The naming of a place when "speaking with names" involves not just a designation; it includes at least a vantage point for the viewing and a historical reference, and often an entire narrative expressing the location's historic significance. Like the Iroquois use of wampum poles, the speaking is meant to console someone suffering extreme stress; "it is a call to persons burdened by worry and despair to take remedial action on behalf of themselves."90 Therefore, to change a landscape, whether nominally or physically, can mean (and did mean in the case of Native American naming practices) to destroy resources central to cultural coherence and survival. Naming practices for Native American civilizations functioned at the same level as proprietary or landholding practices of Europeans. Cotton Mather (among others) was involved in the continuation of the wars that he and his father, Increase Mather, saw as divinely legitimated affirmations of their culture's practices. The erasures continued to the extent that by this century, the absence of indigenous presence was regarded as a preexisting fact rather than an aggressive spatial practice. By the early twentieth century, Native Americans, as they are constructed within the national imaginary, no longer hover on the fringes of public space, as they do in the seventeenthcentury engraving, or have areas of habitation as they did on Cotton Mather's map inaugurating the Christian commonwealth's eighteenth century; they virtually disappear. An example is an early-twentiethcentury statement in a widely distributed civics text designed to teach citizenship. As a lesson in political economy and history, the student is asked to consider her/his inheritances: "When the first settlers came to this country to live, there was nothing here but a few Indians, and forests, soil, minerals, rivers, and lakes."91 The disappearance of most of the indigenous Americans here is handled by having them not exist in the first place (the Euro-American "founding fiction"),92 and what is allowed to become present—soil and minerals—is the stuff from which modern "prosperity" was produced. Instead of the violence that a commercial and sedentary people visited on a more nomadic one, we have a story of the evolution of an economy, as the authors go on to speak of "houses made out of forests" and "conveniences made from minerals."93 Thus, while a political economy cartography helped launch the invasion of America, as the "external zone" of commerce was pushed westward, the same political economy discourse is invoked to erase the deed. The Euro-American narrative of space leaves the aboriginal peoples in prehistory. Those who used the land for something other than commercial exploitation were not really there in the first place. P28 shapiro

This is the root cause of the creation of all war policies – the global conception of U.S coloniality breeds all the militarism that dictates one nation state has the ability to control the territory with-in the border – nation states will always fight to seize the other nation state’s territory.

HOSSEIN-ZADEH 10

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Many Americans still believe that US foreign policies are designed to maintain peace, to safeguard human rights and to spread democracy around the world. Regardless of their officially stated objectives, however, those policies often lead toopposite outcomes: war, militarism and dictatorship. Evidence of the fact that US policy makers no longer uphold the ideals they state publicly is overwhelming. Those who continue to harbor illusions about the thrust of US policies around the world must be oblivious to the fact that the United States has been overtaken by a military-industrial-security-financial cabal whose representatives are firmly ensconced in both the White House and the US Congress. The ultimate goalof the cabal, according to their own military guidelines, is “full spectrum dominance” of the world; and they are willing to wage as many wars, to destroy as many countries and to kill as many people as necessary to achieve that goal**.** The liberal hawks and petty intellectual pundits who tend to defend US foreign policies on the grounds of “human rights” or “moral obligations” are well served to pay attention (among other evidence) to the US foreign policy documents that are currently being disclosed by the Wikileaks. The documents “show all too clearly that,” as Paul Craig Roberts puts it, “the US government is a duplicitous entity whose raison d’etre is to control every other country.” In essence, the documents show that while the US government, like a global mafia godfather, rewards the pliant ruling elites of the client states with arms, financial aid and military protections, it punishes the nations whose leaders refuse to surrender to the wishes of the bully and relinquish their national sovereignty. US foreign policies, like its domestic policies, are revealed as catering not to the broader public or national interests of the people but to the powerful special interests that are vested primarily in the military capital and the finance capital. US foreign policy architects are clearly incapable of recognizing or acknowledging the fact that different peoples and nations may have different needs and interests. Nor are they capable of respecting other peoples’ aspirations to national sovereignty. Instead, they tend to view other peoples, just as they do the American people, through the narrow prism of their own nefarious interests. By selfishly dividing the world into “friends” and “foe,”or “vassal states,” as Zbigniew Brzezinski put it, powerful beneficiaries of war and militarism compel both groups to embark on a path of militarization, which leads inevitably to militarism and authoritarian rule.`Although militarism grows out of the military, the two are different in character. While the military is a means to meet certain ends such as maintaining national security, militarism represents a bureaucratized permanent military establishment as an end in itself. It is “a phenomenon,” as the late Chalmers Johnson put it, “by which a nation’s armed services come to put their institutional preservation ahead of achieving national security or even a commitment to the integrity of the governmental structure of which they are a part” (The Sorrows of Empire, Metropolitan Books, 2004, pp. 423-24).

#### Thus the plan: The United States federal government should open the US-Mexico border with the United Mexican States and eliminate all United States dictated border policies.

## Contention 2: Solvency

#### Open Borders would solve the racial inequality being caused by the current system, and could serve as a stepping stone to other forms of equality

Johnson 2007 Dean of UC Davis School of Law(Kevin R., 2007“Opening the Floodgates; Why America Needs to Rethink Its Borders and Immigration Laws”)

Border enforcement could focus on the true dangers to U.S. society, rather than the exclusion of hardworking people simply seeking to better their lives in pursuit of the American Dream. The immigration laws would thus stand to better protect national security and public safety than the current ones do. The current system is woefully inadequate at basic tracking of the noncitizen population. The United States, by ensuring the legal entry of most noncitizens, would have a much better record than it currently does of who in fact is entering the country and where they live once here, furthering the important goal of protecting public safety and national security. Millions of noncitizens would not be living in the shadows of American society, outside the purview of law enforcement and the protections of the law, as they are today.¶ With immigrants’ fear of removal reduced significantly, exploitation of undocumented immigrants in the workplace might well decline on its own accord. Employers would not hold the strong lever of undocumented status over these immigrants, which often allows employers to dictate the terms of the employment relationship to workers. However, better enforcement of basic labor and employment law would presumably still be necessary. Governmental resources could be redirected from¶ ￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼ ¶ wasteful border enforcement efforts to enforcing basic workplace protections for all workers. Removing the stigma of “illegal” immigration status thus would benefit all workers. In no small part, this would happen because the current dual labor market—one regulated by law and the other that is not—that exists today would be dismantled, thus creating the opportunity for regulation of the workplace of all workers.¶ Legal avenues for immigrating to the United States would replace illegal means of entry. Open borders thus hold the promise of drastically reducing deaths on the border, an everyday occurrence in contemporary times. They would also reduce the current racial discrimination that plagues immigration enforcement in the United States and seeps into all aspects of American social life. Human trafficking would be reduced, as would the criminal element engaged in the deadly, exploitative, and downright horrifying trade in human beings.¶ In essence, open borders would go far to clean up the inequality and injustice that are perpetrated by the current U.S. immigration laws and their enforcement.¶

#### **The 1AC’s criticism of borders opens up a new reconceptualization of the way the border is viewed –this framework reinvents the notion of identity to the Hispanic body.**

Ortiz ’12 (Roxana, PhD in Literary Theory and Comparative Literature from the Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain, “De-constructing the border: Maternal language interdiction (and it is literary representation)”, <http://roxanarodriguezortiz.com/2012/03/21/de-constructing-the-border-maternal-language-interdiction-and-it-is-literary-representation/>)

As I have tried to argue, research at the border brings forth a new debate on theories and paradigms. On a specific geographical setting such as the border different theories interplay. It is important to set precedence on research done so far at the US-Mexican border so we can juxtapose different assessments and disciplines in order to understand present reality as well as deconstruct the dominant discourse; we can avoid, in this manner, historical racism or the advancement of a homogeneous monocultural process at the border. In this sense it is important to rethink the concept of borders so as to speak of our limitations and from here restructure the notions that have permeated contemporary research into border (whatever these may be). From this perspective it is important to develop new models and concepts so that they can, on one side, guide future actions and policies towards the border population and, on the other, allow us an epistemological approach within and from the border and into their own process of cultural and identity conformation.

#### Therefore debate is an essential activity because it shapes our knowledge about the world and how to interact with it. Power shapes everything we do, and criticism is necessary to create spaces for agency, and new forms of knowledge production.

Giroux ‘6 (Henry A. Giroux, 11-2-06, Cultural Studies in Dark Times: Public Pedagogy and the Challenge of Neoliberalism, <http://firgoa.usc.es/drupal/node/25904>)

In opposition to these positions, I want to reclaim a tradition in radical educational theory and cultural studies in which pedagogy as a critical practice is central to any viable notion of agency, inclusive democracy, and a broader global public sphere. Pedagogy as both a language of critique and possibility looms large in these critical traditions, not as a technique or a priori set of methods, but as a political and moral practice. As a political practice, pedagogy is viewed as the outgrowth of struggles and illuminates the relationships among power, knowledge, and ideology, while self-consciously, if not self-critically, recognizing the role it plays as a deliberate attempt to influence how and what knowledge and identities are produced within particular sets of social relations. As a moral practice, pedagogy recognizes that what cultural workers, artists, activists, media workers, and others teach cannot be abstracted from what it means to invest in public life, presuppose some notion of the future, or locate oneself in a public discourse. The moral implications of pedagogy also suggest that our responsibility as intellectuals for the public cannot be separated from the consequences of the knowledge we produce, the social relations we legitimate, and the ideologies and identities we offer up to students as well as colleagues. Refusing to decouple politics from pedagogy means, in part, creating those public spaces for engaging students in robust dialogue, challenging them to think critically about received knowledge and energizing them to recognize their own power as individual and social agents. Pedagogy has a relationship to social change in that it should not only help students frame their sense of understanding, imagination, and knowledge within a wider sense of history, politics, and democracy but should also enable them to recognize that they can do something to alleviate human suffering, as the late Susan Sontag (2003) has suggested. Part of this task necessitates that cultural studies theorists and educators anchor their own work, however diverse, in a radical project that seriously engages the promise of an unrealized democracy against its really existing and greviously incomplete forms. Of crucial importance to such a project is rejecting the assumption that theorists can understand social problems without contesting their appearance in public life. More specifically, any viable cultural politics needs a socially committed notion of injustice if we are to take seriously what it means to fight for the idea of the good society. Zygmunt Bauman (2002) is right in arguing that "if there is no room for the idea of wrong society, there is hardly much chance for the idea of good society to be born, let alone make waves" (p. 170). Cultural studies' theorists need to be more forceful, if not more committed, to linking their overall politics to modes of critique and collective action that address the presupposition that democratic societies are never too just, which means that a democratic society must constantly nurture the possibilities for self-critique, collective agency, and forms of citizenship in which people play a fundamental role in shaping the material relations of power and ideological forces that affect their everyday lives. Within the ongoing process of democratization lies the promise of a society that is open to exchange, questioning, and self-criticism, a democracy that is never finished, and one that opposes neoliberal and neoconservative attempts to supplant the concept of an open society with a fundamentalist market-driven or authoritarian one.   Cultural studies theorists who work in higher education need to make clear that the issue is not whether higher education has become contaminated by politics, as much as recognizing that education is already a space of politics, power, and authority. At the same time, they can make visible their opposition to those approaches to pedagogy that reduce it to a set of skills to enhance one's visibility in the corporate sector or an ideological litmus test that measures one's patriotism or ratings on the rapture index. There is a disquieting refusal in the contemporary academy to raise broader questions about the social, economic, and political forces shaping the very terrain of higher education—particularly unbridled market forces, fundamentalist groups, and racist and sexist forces that unequally value diverse groups within relations of academic power.

## Contention 3: Impact Framing

#### The neg’s mentality to sacrifice anything and everything to avoid nuclear war causes ontological damnation that outweighs nuclear war – the aff helps us survive nuclear war AND avoid ontological damnation, the impact is hell on earth

Zimmerman 94, (Professor of Philosophy at Tulane), 1994 (Michael, Contesting the Earth’s Future, p. 104).

Heidegger asserted that human self-assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being and human Dasein.53Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might "bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth."54This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one's soul by losing one's relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur an ontological clearing through which such life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity's one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any "being" at all, the loss of humanity's openness for being is already occurring.55Modernity's background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material "happiness" for everyone by reducing nature to pure energy.56The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity's slow-motion destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided nuclear war only to survive as contented clever animals, Heidegger believed we would exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth, masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead. But most of them could not agree that the loss of humanity's relation to being would be worse than nuclear omnicide, for it is wrong to suppose that the lives of millions of extinct and unknown species are somehow lessened because they were never "disclosed" by humanity.

#### We do not reject the state – using the state is key to epistemically change the mindset of the state – though notions of nuclear war and big stick impacts are predicated on an irrationality because there is an inherent improbability to the disad’s impact.

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This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of 'scarcity' in response to ecological, energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and historical materialism). Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics. Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale - in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox's words, because positivist IR theory 'does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it'.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason -thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises. By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military-political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to 'securitise' them - and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity. 'Securitisation' refers to a 'speech act' - an act of labelling - whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military-police measures in purported response to an existential danger. The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating 'new security challenges', and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the 'surface' of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to 'new security challenges' such as 'low-intensity' intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such 'new security challenges' are non-military in origin - whether their referents are states or individuals - the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military-political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations - rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential 'threat-multipliers' of traditional security issues such as 'political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens'. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources. The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a 'stress-multiplier' that will 'exacerbate tensions' and 'complicate American foreign policy'; while the EU perceives it as a 'threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability'.95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this 'securitisation' of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conflict up to 2050. It warns of 'resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies', particularly due to a projected 'youth bulge' in the South, which 'will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy'. This will prompt a 'return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets'. Finally, climate change will 'compound' these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conflict are ominous.’97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.’98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’99 Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how secur-itisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarization against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous 'outsiders\*. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new "outsider\* identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of 'Otherisation'. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying 'discursive complex", where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on 'the construction of stark boundaries\* that 'operate to exclude and include\*. Yet these exclusionary discourses are 'intimately bound up with political and economic processes', such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of 'maintaining American hegemony\* by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100 But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests — exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of 'othering\* in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously 'included\* groups become 'ideologically recast' and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines — eventually legitimising their annihilation.102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and 'Otherised' in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of 'inclusion\*, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.1 3 This recalls Lemkin's recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project - or colonial project — designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable. Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new 'outsider' group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105 This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed 'outsider' group vindicating various forms of violence.

**They would model – Nieto and other politicians oppose the border because it violates notions of unity.**

**Rueda 6/13** (Manuel, LA correspondent for ABC news, Mexico Slams U.S. Border Buildup Plan, <http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/mexico-slams-us-immigration-reform-bills-proposed-border/story?id=19495974>, Kris)

It took a while, but after several calls for action from prominent intellectuals, **the Mexican government finally said something about the United States' proposed plans to scale up security on its side of the border.** **Mexico's Secretary of Foreign Affairs**, Jose Meade, read a statement to reporters Tuesday afternoon in which he **criticized a U.S. bill that would add 700 miles of border fencing and double the number of Border Patrol agents, in exchange for the legalization of 11 million undocumented immigrants. "We are convinced that fences do not unite [both nations],"** Meade said. "**The enlargement of this wall is not congruent with plans to create a modern and secure border, and to develop the region."** Meade thanked the U.S. government for the bill's main aim: trying to establish a legal status for millions of undocumented immigrants living in the U.S., many of whom are Mexican. **But** **he said that plans for increased fencing and patrolling - which have been attached to immigration reform efforts by conservative politicians - would hamper commerce along the border and disrupt the lives of 14 million people who live in counties on either side of the fence.** "**Our country has let the U.S. government know that measures which will affect the links between communities do not coincide with the principles of good neighborship and shared responsibility,"** Meade said in typical diplomatic parlance. His criticisms may sound tame, but they actually mark an interesting shift in the Mexican government's position on the immigration reform debate. In recent years, the administrations of Presidents Enrique Peña **Nieto** and Felipe Calderón had **stayed strictly on the sidelines of that debate, reluctant to issue any pronouncements that might stoke U.S. worries about Mexican intervention in American affairs. Some analysts have also argued that any Mexican declarations could be used as ammunition by congressional critics of immigration reform**. But after momentum gathered around plans for a law enforcement buildup on the border, several well-known analysts in Mexico pressed their government to say something about U.S. immigration reform, arguing that at some point, Mexico had to stand up for the interests of its citizens at home and abroad. "This is a contradiction," historian Lorenzo Meyer [said in a Monday morning radio show](http://aristeguinoticias.com/2406/mexico/mexico-sin-voluntad-para-defender-intereses-ante-eu-analistas-mvs/) about plans to build up border defenses. **"The United States wants commerce with Mexico, they want [laws that allow U.S.] investment, but they don't want the unavoidable part of this relationship between unequal countries: The [Mexican] workers." "It is a very unfriendly move," former foreign minister Jorge Castañeda** [**said Tuesday on MVS Noticias**](http://aristeguinoticias.com/2506/mexico/reforma-migratoria-de-eu-debe-legalizar-mexicanos-y-abrir-puertas-castaneda/)**, one of Mexico's top radio shows. Castañeda described the U.S. proposal as something that would happen along the borders of enemy countries** "like North Korea and South Korea" - another border where the U.S. stations thousands of troops. So if the U.S. border buildup proceeds, what will Mexico do in response? It is still unclear. But a couple of suggestions have been made. "**We have things we can shut down, too," said Meyer, who suggested that in retaliation, the Mexican government could make it harder for U.S companies to invest in the country, or cancel laws that enable U.S. citizens to buy property in Mexico.** Meyer said that while those measures might have a small impact, **they could "send a signal" to the U.S. government about Mexico's displeasure with the border fence.**